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not entitled to recover. This view is supported by authority in other
jurisdictions.
7
FRANKLIN T. DuppEE, JR.
Practice and Procedure-judgment by Default and Inquiry-
Evidence Relevant to Damages.
The plaintiff's car was demolished by defendant's truck in an acci-
dent due to the alleged negligence of the truck driver. Judgment was
by default and inquiry; evidence offered to prove that the accident re-
sulted from plaintiff's negligence was ruled inadmissible. Held A
judgment by default admits the cause of action, but on the inquiry de-
fendant fs entitled to establish facts in mitigation of damages. Evi-
dence showing how the accident occurred is competent, therefore, not
as a bar to liability, but to show the amount of damages properly as-
sessable on the inquiry.'
In North Carolina, the rule is well settled that a judgment by de-
fault and inquiry establishes a cause of action of the kind properly
pleaded in the complaint ;2 plaintiff's right at least to nominal damages ;3
and precludes defendant from offering any evidence in bar of the ac-
tion.4 Other state courts are in accord with the North Carolina view,5
but this court is not clear in declaring what 'constitutes evidence in bar.
For instance, in an action for goods sold and delivered the defendant
was allowed to prove non-delivery ;6 but in another similar action, the
defendants' evidence that the goods were not delivered to themselves as
individuals but as officers of a buying corporation was inadmissible.
7
In the instant case, while saying that the judgment admits the cause
'Ordway v. Boston R. Co., 69 N. H. 429, 45 Atf. 243 (1899); Morrow v.
Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 84 S. C. 224, 66 S. E. 186 (1909) ; Bartert v. Seehorn,
25 Wash. 261, 65 Pac. 185 (1901).
'DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C. 687, 175 S. E. 179 (1934).
2 Graves v. Cameron, 161 N. C. 549, 77 S. E. 841 (1913) ; Plumbing Co. v. Hotel
Co., 168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1008 (1915).
'Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C. 291 (1869) ; Osborn v. Leach, 133 N. C.
428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Stockton v. Mining Co., 144 N. C. 595, 57 S. E. 335
(1907) ; Mfg. Co. v. McQueen, 189 N. C. 311, 127 S. E. 246 (1925).
'Gerrard v. Dollar, 49 N. C. 175 (1856) ; Lee v. Knapp, 90 N. C. 171 (1882);
Mitchell v. Express Co., 178 N. C. 235, 100 S. E. 307 (1919). Cf. Osborn v.
Leach, 133 N. C. 428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C.
291 (1869).
1 Electrolitic Chlorine Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 328 Mo. 782, 41 S. W.
(2d) 1049 (1931) ; Smithers v. Brunkhorst, 178 Wis. 530, 190 N. W. 349 (1922) ;
Loellke v. Grant, 120 Ill. App. 74 (1905). Iowa denies the defendant any right
beyond the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses; IowA CODE (1931),
§11591; Elwell, Lyman & Co., v. Betchell & Ross, 68 Iowa 755, 12 N. W. 273
(1882).
"Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C. 291 (1869). See also Graves v. Cam-
eron, 161 N. C. 549, 77 S. E. 841 (1913).
'Lee v. Knapp, 90 N. C. 171 (1882).
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of action, the court allows proof of the plaintiff's negligence. s Chief
Justice Stacy carefully avoids use of the term "contributory negligence"
which would be an affirmative defense in bar,0 but in a previous de-
cision by the same jurist, the definition given would so characterize the
present defense.' 0 The effect of this decision is that the negligence of
plaintiff and defendant are compared to arrive at the proper damages.'"
The rule applied where judgment is on a verdict of the jury, that con-
tributory negligence must be pleaded and that it bars the plaintiff's ac-
tion,' 2 is abandoned. Will the decision therefore foster a new body of
law which dispenses with the necessity of giving plaintiff notice of
defenses by pleading them, and to be applied or ignored in the discre-
tion of the court? That implication necessarily follows, for in the ab-
sence of a consistent line of authority the trial judge must use his own
notion of justice in deciding whether a particular defense, affirmative
or not, relates to the question of damages.
The limitation on the defendant's time for pleading, obviously neces-
sary to insure trial of the case, occasions no hardship which calls for
the instant ruling; for even after judgment has been rendered, he may
have the case reopened for excusable neglect. Grounds therefor are
specified by statute.'8 Thus it is difficult to see why the North Caro-
lina court must depart from logic and precedent to give the defendant
additional advantages on the inquiry.
MAURICE V. BARNEILL, JR.
Real Propety-Status of Proceeds of Sale of Real Estate
Held by the Entirety.
Husband and wife sold real estate of which they were seised by
the entirety. The husband took the money thus received and placed it
8 DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C. 687, 690, 175 S. E. 179, 181 (1934). In illustrat-
ing, Judge Stacy says, "Upon execution of the inquiry, B offers to show how the
accident occurs, not to escape his liability of a penny and costs established by the
judgment, but to show that A's damages, over and above the amount fixed by
the default judgment, was the result of a self-inflicted injury (not contributory
negligence). .. "
"West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 184 N. C. 179, 113 S. E.
672 (1922).
"West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 184 N. C. 179, 113
S. E. 672 (1922).
1 The doctrine of comparative negligence has not heretofore been recognized
in this state except in cases coming within the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
and our own statute, N. C. CoDE ANNr. (Michie, 1931) §3467, which relates to ac-
tions by employees against common carriers; Moore v. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Works, 183 N. C. 438, 111 S. E. 776 (1922).
1N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §523.
13N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §600; the statute declares that the judge
shall relieve the defaulting party where there has been "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect."
